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“An avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty.  
It leads men to stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws.  
He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from 
oppression; 
 for if he violates his duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself.”  
 


































Although the majority of the rules of International Humanitarian Law [IHL], both 
conventional and customary, regulate international armed conflicts, it is non-
international armed conflict that the contemporary world is predominated by.
1
 After 
the adoption of the United Nations Charter, the era of the colonial strife, especially 
during the 1960‟s and 1970‟s has given way to an ever-increasing struggle of self 
determination.
2





The daily lives of many civilians caught up in domestic (that is non-
international) conflicts are too often ruled by fear and extreme suffering. Being 
displaced as a people, used as human shields, being victims of sexual violence and 
hate-crimes, arbitrary and indiscriminate attacks and even torture are unfortunate 
common realities of modern armed conflict. The challenges presented by these 
conflicts are, to a certain extent related to a lack of applicable rules, but more 
importantly, to a lack of respect for IHL. 
 
The familiar characteristic of armed conflicts around the world that are non-
international is the asymmetry of these conflicts.
4
 The asymmetry may consist of a 
disparity in technological power, which often translates into a disparity in 
compliance with the laws of armed conflict.
5
 It may also consist of differences in 
legal or historical status - especially when the conflict is between a state and a non-
state actor.  
 
                                                          
1
 See inter alia M. Sollenberg (ed.) States In Armed Conflict (1997) 7 and Appendix 1, 13.  
2
 J Gardam Necessity, proportionality and the use of force by states (2004) 121. 
3
 Gardam (note 2) at 121. She apportions this inadequacy to IHL‟s dependency on the development of 
International law in domestic affairs which has been prima facie outside of its scope.   
4
 B Roberts Asymmetric Conflict 2010 (2000). 
5
 Y Ronen Avoid or Compensate? Liability for Incidental Injury to Civilians Inflicted During Armed 














The extreme violation of the laws of armed conflict, namely the deliberate 
and systematic targeting of civilians, is usually characteristic of non-state actors.
6
 
However, it is important not to fall into the subjective trap of ruling out state actors 





The Israeli Defence Force [IDF] „Operation in Gaza‟, otherwise known as „Operation 
Cast Lead‟ began with a week-long air attack, from 27 December 2008 to 3 January 
2009.
8
 In addition to the continuance of the aerial bombardment, the IDF claims that 
it was „necessary‟ to escalate the operation with ground manoeuvres on 3 January 
2009,
9
 and after the Security Council had adopted Resolution 1860
10
 on 8 January 
2009, that it was then further necessary to „expand‟ those ground manoeuvres in 
order to „enter deeper into Gaza‟ on 10 January 2009.
11
 Operation Cast Lead lasted 





The "facts" surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have always been 
controversial. For many reasons, including the concerned parties' attempt at 
distorting the historical record.
13
 The Operation in Gaza is no exception. As a result 
                                                          
6
 J McNee, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, Statement to the Security 
Council on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (June 22, 2007), available at 
http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/prmny-mponu/canada_un-canada_onu/statements-
declarations/security_council-conseil_securite/9890.aspx?lang=eng [Accessed 15 September 2009]. 
7
 „[T]here have... been what can only be called opportunistic misinterpretations of certain time tested, 
specific legal rules. The tendency by some actors to point to alleged violations by others, without 
showing any willingness to acknowledge ongoing violations of their own, has also been detrimental to 
the proper application of the law.‟ International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary 
armed conflicts (2007) 4, available at: http://icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/ihl-30-
international-conference-101207/$File/IHL-challenges-30th-International-Conference-ENG.pdf 
[Accessed 19 September 2009]. 
8
 Human rights in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, Report of the United Nations Fact 
Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (Advance Edited Version) (2009) 102 at para 333 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Goldstone], available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/docs/UNFFMGC_Report.pdf 
[Accessed on 17 September 2009].  
9
 The Operation in Gaza, Factual and Legal Aspects (2009) 32. at para 85 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Operation in Gaza], available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/E89E699D-A435-491B-B2D0-
017675DAFEF7/0/GazaOperationwLinks.pdf [Accessed 26 August 2009].  
10
 Resolution 1860 called, inter alia, upon Member States to increase efforts to provide arrangements 
and guarantees in Gaza in order to sustain a durable ceasefire and calm. 
11
 The Operation in Gaza (note 9) 32 at para 85. 
12
 Ibid, 33 at para 86. 
13
 See Jews for Justice in The Middle East Origin of Arab-Israeli conflict, available at: 














of this disparity of information insofar as the true facts are concerned, this article will 
not attempt to address the wide range of claims made by the International 
Community; instead it will focus on the most frequent claim made against Israel,
14
 
the accusation of resorting to excessive, disproportionate force.
15
  The article will 
focus on the legal principles concerned; specifically exploring the ius in bello 
principle of proportionality.  
 
Part I will be a brief introduction as to the current understanding of the IHL 
principles of distinction, military necessity and ultimately, proportionality. After 
having already discussed some of the current views on these principles, in Part II  I 
will put forward various shortcomings and suggested remedies for ius in bello 
proportionality in modern day armed conflict. Part III will explore what I contend to 
be a necessary extension of IHL that will more ably provide a platform for the 
application of the ius in bello principle proportionality. I will then apply this notion 




 regarding Israel‟s application of 
ius in bello proportionality during Operation Cast Lead. This article will not in any 
way attempt to fully explore in detail either the UNHRC Goldstone Report
18
 or the 
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs‟ [MFA] Report
19
 issued by the State of Israel. 
 
Further, I will not address the initial legal question of the existence, or 
subsequent classification of the conflict in Gaza. Instead I will assume that an armed 
attack as defined in the Tadic Case
20
 was amounted to, and that as such, IHL does 
apply.
21
 Addressing the theoretical
22
 concern of whether this armed conflict falls 
under the rules of international, or of non-international armed conflict (that is 
defining the status of Gaza) would be a separate discussion this paper will not be 
                                                          
14
 A Cohen The Principle of Proportionality in the Context of Operation Cast Lead: Institutional 
Perspectives (2009) 35 Rutgers Law Record 23, 3. 
15
 Amnesty International, The Conflict in Gaza: a briefing on applicable law, investigations and 
applicable law (2009), available at, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE15/007/2009/en/4dd8f595-e64c-11dd-9917-
ed717fa5078d/mde150072009en.pdf [Accessed 19 September 2009]. 
16
 Operation in Gaza (note 9). 
17




 Operation in Gaza (note 9). 
20
 Prosecutor v. Tadić (1995) ICTY at para 70. 
21
 Even though it still disputes the legal status of Gaza, it must be noted at this stage that Israel itself 
has accepted this premise of IHL‟s application in the hostilities during the operation. (Operation in 
Gaza, 10 at para 28.   
22














addressing. In assuming IHL does apply, the ius in bello principle of proportionality 




Part I.  IHL discussed 
 
Ensuring civilian protection while fulfilling military objectives during armed conflict 
forms the „backbone of the customary Laws of War.‟
24
 Typically, achieving at least 
some military advantage is necessary in the fulfilment of military objectives; 
unfortunately more often than not, this includes the destruction of a target.
25
 
International Humanitarian Law can be defined as the branch of International Law 
limiting the use of violence in armed conflicts by a) sparing those who do not, or no 
longer directly participate in hostilities and b) limiting the violence to the amount 
necessary to achieve the aim of the conflict. According to Sassoli and Bouvir, this 
brief definition leads to some basic principles of IHL: 
 
1) The distinction between civilians and combatants 
2) The prohibition on attacking those hors de combat 
3) The prohibition on inflicting unnecessary suffering 
4) The principle of Necessity and  
5) Proportionality26 
 
Present day development of the modern and relevant rules for military procedure 
allows us to codify the laws of engagement within three broader principles (points 1, 
4 and 5 above): distinction, necessity, and proportionality form the core of ius in 
                                                          
23
 As the Special Court for Sierra Leone held, „it is well settled that all parties to an armed conflict, 
whether States or non-State actors, are bound by international humanitarian law, even though only 
States may become parties to international treaties.‟ Operation in Gaza (note 9) 10 at para 32.  
24
 S Ghoshray When does collateral damage rise to the level of a war crime?: expanding the adequacy 
of laws of war against contemporary human rights discourse (2008) 41 Creighton Law Review 679, 
6. 
25
 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] at 
art. 51(2). 
26
 M Sassoli and A Bouvir, How does Law Protect in War ? Cases, Documents and Teaching 
Materials on Contemporary Practise in International Humanitarian Law: Vol 1, 2
nd

















 Having established the framework of these principle components 
of IHL, an examination of these principles within the context of modern hostilities is 
required by this article. This will allow for a better understanding of the continuing 
principles of International Law in its current form.  
 
I will discuss the principles of Distinction and military Necessity first, however 
merely as an introduction to the third core principle of Proportionality - the 
understanding and contemporary application of this ius in bello principle will be the 
main focus of the article. 
1) The Principle of Distinction 
 
Distinction (also sometimes known as discrimination) requires that militaries must 
recognize the difference between combatants and non combatants before the attack 
begins,
28
and only attack the former.
29
 This customary international law principle is 
reflected in Additional Protocol I, „[t]he civilian population as such, as well as 
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the 
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are 
prohibited;‟
30




Protocol I's prohibition of indiscriminate attack can be attributed to the 
codification of the distinction principle.
32
 Article 51(4) reflects that attacks must not 
be „indiscriminate,‟ that is, they cannot be launched without consideration as to 
where harm will likely fall.
33
 It is recalled by Article 22 of the Hague regulations, 




                                                          
27
 James Turner Johnson, Morality & Contemporary Warfare 23 (1999), at 29 tbl.3. 
28
 M N Schmitt The principle of discrimination in 21st century warfare, 2 Yale Human Rights & 
Development  Law Journal 143, 148-49 (1999). 
29
 H Fischer Comment: Human shields, homicide, and house of fires: How a domestic law analogy 
can guide international law regarding human shield tactics in armed conflict American University 
Law Review (2007) 57 Am. U.L. Rev. 479 at 8. 
30




 M N Schmitt (note 28). 
33
 Protocol I (note 25) art 51(4). 
34
 Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to Hague Convention IV 
(adopted 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910) (1907) 205 CTS 227 (Hague 















The principle of distinction contains three facets: 
 
1) The prohibition placed on the targeting or attacking of civilian persons, 
2) The prohibition placed on the targeting or attacking of civilian objects; and 
3) The prohibition placed on indiscriminate attacks.35 
 
It follows that acts of „firing indiscriminately at civilian houses or bombing civilian 
infrastructures without [properly applying the principle of dstinction] should be 




The doctrine of distinction has the ability to make the most profound 
difference between life and death. Regardless of interpretations related to necessity 
and proportionality, correct interpretation of distinction allows, for solely military 




2) The Principle of Necessity 
 
The idea of military necessity was expressed as far back, if not further than, the 1868 
St Petersburg Declaration;
38
 however, military operations during times of armed 
conflict have undergone substantial changes since this. This evolution of military 
reality has resulted in confusions regarding the proper definition and application of 
military concepts like the principle of necessity. As a result of military planners and 
human rights organizations disagreeing over both the rudiments and interpretation of 
military necessity, it has become increasingly problematic to apply.
39
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/1d1726425f6955aec125641e0038b
fd6 [Accessed on 15 September 2009]. 
35
 R Kolb and R Hyde An introduction to the international law of armed conflicts (2008) 126. 
36




 Ibid, noting that St Petersburg Declaration renouncing the use of, in times of war, of Explosive 
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight (signed 11 December 1868, entered into force 11 December 
1868) (1868-69) 138 CTS 297: „...[T]he only legitimate object which States should endeavour to 
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; that for this purpose it is 
sufficient to disable the greatest possible amount of men; that this object would be exceeded by the 
employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death 
inevitable.‟   
39














Derived from the definition found in the St Petersburg Declaration, the notion 
of necessity requires a hierarchal approach in its implementation and evaluation.
40
 
Expressed in Article 57(3) of Additional Protocol 1:  
 
„When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining 
similar military advantage, the object to be selected shall be that the attack on 





So although the principle itself is clear, its modern definition and concepts which 
result from it are more indistinct. The law of armed conflict is inter alia, a 
compromise based on a balance between military necessity, on the one hand, and the 
requirements of humanity,
42
 on the other.
43
 A very general definition for the principle 
of necessity is given by Greenspan: military necessity constitutes "the right to apply 
that amount and kind of force which is necessary to compel the submission of the 




Contextually, military necessity refers to the necessity for measures which 
„are essential to attain the goals of war, and which are lawful in accordance with the 
laws and customs of war.‟
45
 In paying particular attention to the case law, an 
American writer has attempted a more precise definition than has been alluded to 
above: 
 
"Military necessity is an urgent need, admitting of no delay, for the taking by 
a commander, of measures which are indispensable for forcing as quickly as 
                                                          
40
 R Kolb and R Hyde(note 35) at 47. 
41
 Protocol I (note 25) art 57(3).  
42
 ICRC International Humanitarian Law - Treaties & Documents, Part III : Methods and means of 
warfare 393, available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750044?OpenDocument [Accessed 
23 September 2009]. 
43
 Ibid, also see Operation in Gaza, para 222. 
44
 M. Greenspan, ' The Modern Law of Land Warfare, ' Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959, pp. 313-314 
45
 F. Lieber, ' Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field ' (known as 
the Lieber Code), 1863, art. 14, available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/73cb71d18dc4372741256739003e6372/a25aa5871a04919bc12563cd002d














possible the complete surrender of the enemy by means of regulated violence, 




This definition is based on four foundations: „urgency, measures which are limited to 
the indispensable, the control (in space and time) of the force used, and the means 
which should not infringe an unconditional prohibition.‟
47
 It has been contended 





The confusion as to the true understanding and application of the principle of 
Necessity, I contend, can be largely overcome by accepting its interpretation in the 
Nuremberg Trials where it was formally incorporated: 
 
„[M]ilitary necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply 
any amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the 
enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money.... It 
permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons whose 
destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the war; it 
allows the capturing of armed enemies and others of peculiar danger, but does 
not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the 
satisfaction of a lust to kill. The destruction of property to be lawful must be 
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in 
itself is a violation of international law. There must be some reasonable 





Military necessity does not permit situations of absolute derogation from rules 
drafted in peremptory norms; there is a limit on the application of this principle. 
However, military necessity does give military commanders some freedom of 
                                                          
46
 Ghoshray (note 39) citing W. Downey, 254, In "The Hostages Trial" (Trial of Wilhelm List and 
Others), the American military tribunal declared that: "Military necessity or expediency do not justify 
a violation of positive rules [...] The rules of international law must be followed even if it results in the 
loss of a battle or even a war." The tribunal added that the prohibitions contained in the Hague 
Regulations "are superior to military necessities of the most urgent nature except where the 
Regulations themselves specifically provide the contrary" (15 ' Law Reports ', p. 175, and 8 ' Law 
Reports, ' pp. 66-69) 
47




 Ghoshray (note 24) at 3, citing J D Reynolds, Collateral damage on the 21st century battlefield: 
enemy exploitation of the law of armed conflict, and the struggle for a moral high ground, 56 A.F. L. 














judgment „[when] this is explicitly provided for in the Protocol, as well as in 




Military necessity is limited to measures which are essential to ensure the 
success of an operation that is planned, and are lawful according to the other rules of 








In order to explore proportionality let me begin by laying some foundation as to its 
history. I will not mention too much detail here as the true nature of the ancestry of 
this ius in bello principle is outside of the scope of the article.  
 
Gardam makes the point that the notion of proportionality predates even 
Thomas Aquinas‟ notion of Just War Theory.
52
 In brief, this Theory required that 
„the overall evil a war would cause was balance by the good that would be achieved‟ 
and that once the decision to wage war was made, the conduct or means within the 
war was of secondary (no) concern.
53
 At this stage in history it is important to note 
that there was no distinction made between ius ad bellum and ius in bello as is the 
case in modern armed conflict. The just cause simply warranted the means to an end. 
This mentality was typified by St Augustine‟s Christian „Just War Theory‟ where 
there was no significant limitation on the methods of warfare.
54
 
                                                          
50
 Article 45 of the first Convention of 1949, lays down that judgement in unforeseen cases are to be 
provided for by the Commanders-in-Chief in conformity with the general principles of the 
Convention. Even though the Parties to a conflict may only be bound within the interpretation of IHL 
in a particular case, they will never be exempted from fundamental general humanitarian 
requirements. This concept, based on the Preamble of Hague Convention IV of 1907, is known as the 
Martens Clause and is specified in Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Protocol: “In cases not covered by 
this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the 
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from 
the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience." 
51
 International Humanitarian Law (note 42) at para 1406. 
52



















It was not until the time of the later canonists and the secular law of arms of 
the middle ages that the world saw an emergence of the notion of proportionality in 
the conduct of hostilities.
55
 Johnson is of the opinion that the first limits on warfare 





The nineteenth century that saw the demise of the Just War Theory and the 
development of State sovereignty, especially in terms of decisions to wage war; this 
is where ius in bello began to materialize.
57
 Ius in bello and ius ad bellum became 
two bodies of rules; this era Gardam calls the „Golden Era‟ of ius in bello, saw much 
of the means and methods of warfare codified in the second half of the nineteenth 
century – most notably reflected in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907.
58
 The 
attention given to the notion of proportionality in establishing the limit to suffering 




Contemporary understanding in modern IHL 
 
Ius in bello proportionality imposes on states the obligation not to use military means 
that are more destructive than necessary to accomplish their legitimate goals.
60
 This 
principle is an attempt to balance the potential and actual military and humanitarian 
interests, that is, the military necessity and concept humanity.
61
 Proportionality is the 
strongest civilian protection available in customary international law;
62
 even if it isn‟t 
explicitly specific mentioned, it is a character in many provisions of the Additional 




                                                          
55
 J T Johnson, Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War (1975) pp26-80.  
56
 Ibid, at 80. 
57
 Gardam (note 2) at 49. 
58




 Fischer (note 29). 
61
 A.P.V. Rogers Law on the Battlefield (1996) 17. 
62
 Ghoshray (note 24) at 7. 
63
 International Court of Justice, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins, available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/95/7525.pdf?PHPSESSID=f4f54f2c221c9e6403d19ec03229d593 [Accessed 21 














It‟s modern authority is found inter alia, in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional 
Protocol I. Article 51 of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention is 
an „iteration of ius in bello principles because it purports to establish the immunity of 
non combatants.‟
64
 This Additional Article to Protocol I expressly prohibits the 
launching of military objectives which, "may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 





The principle of proportionality does not nullify military objectives, rather it 
provides some „restrictive covenants surrounding military objectives‟ to reduce, inter 
alia, civilian casualties in military operations.
66
 It makes it mandatory for the 
military planners, under Article 57(2)(a)(ii) of Protocol I, "to take all feasible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, 
and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and 




The principle of proportionality goes to the very core of evaluating the extent 
of collateral damage.
68
  Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the ICC
69
 draws a 
parallel to the above mentioned Protocol on the issue of the “elements of a crime” by 
drawing on the word „excessive‟ found in Article 51(5)(b).  It states that a 
(disproportionate) actionable offence of causing „excessive incidental death, injury or 
damage‟ can only be established when such actions are deemed to be „clearly 
excessive‟ and that excess and proportion is to be assessed „in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated.‟
70
 This establishes a clearly threshold of 
                                                          
64
 A.P.V. Rogers, (note 61) "Protocol I was negotiated ... to the very concept of proportionality". 
65
 Protocol I (note 25) art 51(5)(b). 
66
 Ghoshray (note 36). 
67
 Protocol I (note 25) art 57(2)(a)(ii).  
68
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 17 July 























At a conceptual level, the notion of proportionality is noble; it aims to limit 
the sufferings of civilians in times of conflict. The sources of this concept are 
ancient, and find themselves rooted deeply in the history of international law.
72
 
However, in practice this principle raises many questions.
73
 It is clear from practice 
that the concepts of proportionality and civilian immunity do not necessarily provide 




It is simple to pronounce that civilians are protected from being the object of 
attack, but in reality, many justified military actions have injured or killed civilians.
75
 
The harsh truth is, that „...[m]embers of the armed forces are not liable for... 
incidental [collateral] damage, provided it is proportionate to the military gain 
expected of the attack.‟
76
 The challenge as it logically follows, would be to determine 
how much, if any, collateral damage would be proportional and as such permitted 
within the ambit of IHL?  
 
Part II. Shortcomings of the contemporary test for Proportionality 
 
Ghoshray states that the „humanitarian spirit of IHL obliges a military planner to 
follow  a two step process before targeting a particular object.‟
77
 Firstly, that the 
                                                          
71
 Ghoshray (note 24) at 8. 
72
 Gardam (note 2) at 2. 
73
 Ibid at chapter 4. 
74
 Ghoshray (note 71): Professor Emanuel Gross begs the question in addressing the issue of non-state 
actor groups engaged in terrorism: „How will a democratic state conduct a war against an undefined 
enemy which is dispersed among the civilian population? Should the democratic state remain subject 
to the rules of war and avoid causing harm to population... and thereby also avoid causing harm to the 
terrorists themselves? Or, does the goal of eradicating terrorism justify all means, including collateral 
injury to innocent civilians ... ?‟ Use of Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal and Moral 
Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged by a Democratic State Against Terrorism?, 16 Emory Int'l L. 
Rev. 445, 456 (2002) at 478. 
75
 Human Rights Watch, Fatal Strikes: Israel's Indiscriminate Attacks in Lebanon: Attacks on Fleeing 
Civilians (2006),  available at: http://hrw.org/reports/2006/lebanon0806/5.htm# Toc142299223, 
[Accessed 20 September 2009].  
76
 Major General A.P.V. Rogers, Lecture delivered at Lauterpacht Center for International Law, 
University of Cambridge: Command Responsibility under the Law of War (1999), available at:  
www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/lectures/doc/COMDRESP.doc [Accessed 20 September 2009].  
77














planners ensure the „aggressive manoeuvre is a viable military objective‟, and 
secondly that the planners „determine... whether the resulting collateral damage is 




At face value this two step approach seems to be fairly credible, however it 
present a prime facie point of concern - the likely definition of „viable military 
objective‟. If the global military community is not able to reach a standard 
acceptance as to what a viable military objective is, then, regardless of its contents, 
applying the principle of proportionality would, by extension, be impossible.  
 
The ICTY notes in Oric that  Article 52 of Additional Protocol I defines what 
constitutes a military objective: military objectives are limited to those objects which 
by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military 
action while offering a definite military advantage.
79
 Judge Higgins, in her dissent to 
the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion has put this issue to rest: 
 
„... [E]ven a legitimate [military] target may not be attacked if the collateral 





It follows from what Higgins has said here that any argument advanced which places 
the importance of attaining the military objective, be it defined as legitimate or 
otherwise, above that of the compliance with the principle of proportionality must be 
rejected as unlawful. 
 
                                                          
78
 Ghoshray (note 35). 
79
 Prosecutor v. Oric (2006) at para 587, citing Protocol I (note 25) art 52(2). See also Strugar Trial 
Judgement para 295; Galić Trial Judgement para 51. 
80
 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons I.C.J. Rep. (1996): International Court of Justice, 
Dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins, para 20,  available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/95/7525.pdf?PHPSESSID=f4f54f2c221c9e6403d19ec03229d593 [Accessed 21 

















In analysing the true nature of proportionality, certain shortcomings become 
exposed. Gardam attempts to more comprehensively understand what the ius in bello 
principle evident in both Protocol I
81
 and the Rome Statute
82
 equates to. To do this 
she explores three „component parts‟ of what she calls „the proportionality 
equation.‟
83
 They are 1) the meaning of „attack‟, 2) what is encompassed by the term 
„military advantage‟
84
 and 3) what should be considered in determining „excessive 
collateral damage‟
85
. In breaking down what constitutes the make-up of 
proportionality in this way, it is becomes easier to realise, and potentially overcome, 
some of its inherent pitfalls.  
 
1) The meaning of ‘attack’ 
 
As mentioned in the outline of this paper I will not be exploring the meaning or 
definition of the concept of „attack‟, rather at this point I will address contentions 
surrounding the actual understanding of the concept.  
 
There is a view that the proportionality test is intended to apply to attacks as 
individual military operations of a specific unit;
86
 that small military operations 
should each be seen as separate from one another in terms of the application of 
proportionality. This approach is however limiting as it does not always reflect the 
reality of an overall military operation of which a single attack is merely a part of. 
Modern armed conflict is complex, often requiring many small operations and 
intricate interdependence of different military components. Also, the application of 
                                                          
81
 Protocol I (note 25). 
82
 Rome Statute (note 68).  
83
 Gardam (note 2) at 98-104, (also component parts of Ghoshray‟s two step process mentioned 
above). 
84
 Protocol I (note 25) art 51(5). 
85
 Protocol I (note25) art 51(5)(b); Rome Statute (note 68). 
86
 See C Swinarski, B Zimmermann (eds.) ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 



















Gardam draws on reservations and interpretive declarations by States with 
respect to Protocol I in her conclusion on this point. The notion of an attack in 
assessing military advantage  in the Protocol is understood to „encompass an overall 




2) ‘[M]ilitary advantage’ 
 
The major factor in determining the military advantage in the context of the 
proportionality equation is the importance of the target for achieving a particular 
military objective.
89
 It follows that the more vital the target in question is to military 
strategy, the higher the acceptable level of civilian casualties and damage to civilian 
property will be. A further problem here is that IHL presupposes that parties to an 




Military advantage however is somewhat limited in terms of what can be 
factored into the equation by the Protocols‟ „concrete and direct military 
advantage‟.
91
 The ICRC Commentary proposes that the military advantage 
anticipated from an attack „should be substantial and relatively close, and that 
advantages which are hardly perceptible, and those which would only appear in the 




This more narrow evaluation however, would exclude military advantage from 
being assessed on a cumulative basis. The issue raised in the Kupreskic judgment
93
 
regarding the other extreme of case-by-case analyses though is that „it may happen 
that single attacks on military objectives causing incidental damage to civilians... do 
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not [individually] appear on their face to fall foul per se of the loose prescriptions of 
Articles 57 and 58 (or of the corresponding customary rules)‟ while if assessed 




If casualties are expected to result in excess of concrete and direct military 




It is now commonly accepted that „military advantage taken into consideration 
should be that which results from the action as a whole, and not simply from one of 




3) The determination of ‘excessive collateral damage’ 
 
As Ghoshray alludes to, the Protocol requires steps to be taken in the planning stages 
of a military operation. Gardam says the last of which is the final assessment of 
whether or not, despite the precautions taken, the attack may still result in excessive 
civilian casualties, injury to civilians or damage to civilian property in light of the 
anticipated military advantage.
97
 This assessment of potential collateral damage 
would be far easier if there was a list of requirements for the military planners to 
consider. It would make both comprehension and compliance with the Protocol by 
military planners more procedural and as such likely.  
 
I would contend though that the existence of such a checklist would, by its 
nature, delimit the nature of the assessment, thereby undermining the essential ability 
of the interpretation of the Protocol to adapt to changes in methods and means of 
evolving warfare.  
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In calculating expected levels of collateral damage and to what extent they 
may be deemed to be „excessive‟ or not, planners will be forced to „revisit many of 
the assessments undertaken so as to minimize casualties.‟
98
 These would primarily 
include, but not be limited to, the characteristics and choice of weapons for the 
operation and the nature and location of the target(s).   
 
Weapons have a wide range of differing capabilities and also vary in terms of 
target accuracy. In modern armed conflict there is a greater presence and availability 
than ever before of weapons that are controlled by sophisticated guidance systems. 
These weapons should be employed for the furtherance of civilian safety during 
times of hostilities over those that would be more likely to cause unnecessary (albeit 
incidental) harm.  
 
The nature and location of the target as mentioned above are also of primary 
importance. Whether or not, and consequently the extent to which, the target is 
intermingled with the civilian population needs to be established. The nature and 




Following from this is a point of (mis)understanding that attracts many 
differing views, especially in modern IHL - to what extent must a military planner 
take into account the likely casualties resulting from a planned military operation if 
the defender deliberately places military objectives near to civilian objects?  
 
Preferring a more humane approach, Gardam suggests that instead of 
discounting the applicability of the principle of proportionality in limiting the 
anticipated casualties completely,  that the planners‟ force be assessed in terms of 
what they have control over.
100
 So although the tactic of exposing civilians to risk 
will not necessarily prevent an attack on a target, it will regulate the manner in which 
it is carried out.
101
 




 See J D Reynolds Collateral damage on the 21st century Battlefield: enemy exploitation of the law 
of armed conflict, and the struggle for a moral high ground (2005) 56 Air Force Law Review 1, 15 
(2005). 
100
 Gardam (note 2) at 104. 
101
 Kolb (note 35) refers to the application of art 57(3) of protocol I in NATO Bombings (note 96) at 















After having reaffirming the fact that the use of civilians as human shields is 
contrary to the rules of the Protocol under Article 51(7), I conclude this point by 
highlighting that the failure of the defending state to abide by these rules does not 
relieve the attacker from its obligation under Article 51(8), to consider whether the 




When assessing the potential for and scope of collateral damage, the question 
of a time frame is also of importance. Whether this assessment of humanitarian 
considerations should be conducted in the short term or long term is unclear. 
Nowhere is there any reflection on the importance of long term damage 
assessment.
103
 Greenwood points out that the Protocol was negotiated with the 
primary intention of limiting casualties during attacks.
104
 However, if short term 
effects are the narrow focus of assessment then there is likely to be a lower threshold 





The geographical location can also be of significant importance. If an attack 
on the area would result in for example a landslide or flood, this would obviously 
have a massive effect on the potential civilian, and other, loss of life and property.  
 
In determining whether an attack was proportionate, it is necessary to 
examine whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the 
actual perpetrator would have acted in the same way in the heat of battle.
106
 An issue 
that arises out of this is that the assessment of a commanders proportionality is made 
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in hindsight. While it is easy to make assumptions and critique actions persued on the 
battlefield, it is difficult if not impossible to accurately interpret the true 
circumstances of a military operation after the fact. 
 
If sufficient warnings of immanent attacks are not given to the population 
before the time, this would also be a major factor to consider when assessing the 
likely extent of excessive civilian collateral damage. It is however understood by the 
wording of Article 57(2)(c) that advanced warnings need to be given if the 
circumstances do not permit.
107
 Here it must be noted that this subjective assessment 
of the circumstances on behalf of the military planner (in deciding whether or not the 
circumstances warrant a warning) is an inherent problem in of itself. 
 
Even though Protocol I, along with the principle of proportionality, enjoys a 
customary international law status, the difficulty remains in its application. As the 
Committee established to review NATO„s bombing campaign in the former 
Yugoslavia emphasised:  
 
„The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not 
it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied. It is relatively simple to 
state that there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate 
destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects. … Unfortunately, most 
applications of the principle of proportionality are not quite so clear cut. It is 
much easier to formulate the principle of proportionality in general terms than 
it is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances because the comparison is 




The concept of proportionality suffers from a fault inherent in any attempt to balance 
(in this case military) rights and (humanitarian) interests – as noted in the NATO 
case,
109
 the concepts are incomparable.
110
 It would be impractical, even impossible, 
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To assign these variables values would be the attempt at balancing military 
advantage against human lives; how should one assess the worth of a (or thousands 
of) human life? Even if this hurdle was overcome, Cohen puts forward the problem 
of further distinguishing the values of these human lives between those of citizens 
from both sides of the conflict –would the values attached to the lives of the 





Further, Cohen questions whether or not the parties involved in hostilities 
would be entitled to „protect their own citizens or soldiers at the cost of endangering 




Looking past these moral issues regarding the nature of proportionality, the 
temporal element of its character presents one particularly noteworthy issue. As has 
been discussed, the test of proportionality is applied ex ante, that is, before the actual 
military operation. Hence, the military and humanitarian effects of the attack, as well 
as the harm it is designed to prevent, are „merely speculative and ultimately depend 




This „balancing‟ test suffers from a serious drawback in the modern era of 
armed conflict;  it depends on individual subjective human characteristics. During 
times of war these „human characteristics become severely infected with prejudice, 




These, and other limitations not mentioned above, seem to raise many legal 
questions with respect to several major military operations of the recent past.
116
 The 
formula of proportionality in article 51(5)(b) of Protocol I, remains ambiguous and 
difficult to implement. It is because of this ambiguity, that the international 
community is left with these questions that will for now unfortunately be left 
unanswered. 
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After having expanded on Gardam‟s „Equation of Proportionality‟ and further 
extensively discussed the understanding of the principle of ius in bello 
proportionality, at this point I arrive at an unnerving conclusion. In order to 
determine the extent to which the civilian casualties would be "excessive" when 
weighed against the anticipated military advantage, (to be found disproportionate in 
terms of IHL), one would ultimately need to evaluate the factual circumstances 
concerning the military exercise; evaluating the principle of proportionality depends 
on the facts of the case at hand. Hackneyed  
 
Proposed solutions to overcoming shortcomings in interpretation of 
proportionality 
 
Having enumerated but a few modern points of debate regarding ius in bello 
proportionality,  I will now advance two proposed steps towards more easily 
applying the principle(s) in question. Finally I will arrive at what I will conclude to 
be the most feasible  mechanism for the application and assessment of contemporary 
ius in bello proportionality.   
 
Doctrine of Double Effect  
 
The doctrine of double effect „is often invoked to explain the permissibility of an 
action that causes a serious harm, such as the death of a human being, as a side effect 
of promoting some good end.‟
117
 Fischer  suggests that the application of the 
Doctrine of Double Effect ("DDE")as a means of performing „the calculus necessary 
to determine when unintended, but foreseeable, civilian casualties are morally 
justified in the context of a military action‟.
118
  In his opinion this doctrine „balances 
parties' interests in defence and civilian immunity while accounting for actors' 
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 However, this is about all Fischer says about the applicability of this 
Doctrine and I believe this speaks of to its inadequacy in modern times of conflict.  
 
The bridging of ius ad bellum and ius in bello 
 
Benvenisti suggest that bridging the divide between ius in bello and ius ad bellum, by 
„expanding the ius in bello proportionality test to include aspects of the ad bellum 





He states that „according to the traditional ius in bello standard, each enemy 
is entitled to pursue its adversary until its total defeat...,  it increasingly becomes 
relevant to inquire - at least in political discourse, if not in positive law - to what 




By allowing ius in bello proportionality analysis to be able to take into 
account not only the ad bellum question of „who is to blame for the commencement 
of hostilities‟, but also for it to  incorporate „the decision of one of the parties to 
pursue unrelated goals or to prolong the military confrontation instead of negotiating 
its end,‟ he contends that it would offer a more comprehensive assessment of the 




Under this proposed „bridged‟ framework, the party who had either no 
legitimate reason to resort to force, or no good reason to pursue it further, „would be 
more limited in its ability to justify the infliction of harm on non-combatants when 
pursuing its military objectives.‟
123
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If these propositions were to become part of the law, Benvenisti contends 
they would effect a major change: ius in bello proportionality analysis would then 
require the attacker to explain the necessity of attaining the military objective. The 
necessity of such action is taken for granted [through the subjective valuation by the 
military planners] in traditional IHL. 
 
While I would not be completely opposed to the notion of „contextual 
assessment‟ lying at the heart of Benvenisti‟s proposal, I would be wary to encourage 
further blurring of the divided between these two regimes of law. If the ad bellum 
resort to force is deemed to be unfit and as a result the ius in bello actions are 
rendered equally unfit, then there would be no incentive for armed forces to act in 
line with IHL once engaged in unlawful armed hostilities. If we begin to mix the 
applications in certain instances, and of certain rules of armed conflict, the rule of 
law will become even more (unnecessarily) complex; both in understanding and in 
application.  
 
Part III. The contemporary future?  
 
I believe the most realistic means of accurately applying proportionality in 
contemporary society can be extrapolated from the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as 
the High Court of Justice (HCJ) in the Targeted Killing case.
124
 Without going into 
the facts of the case, Justice Aaron Barak (then President of Israel's Supreme Court) 
postulated in his judgment that „...operations ought to be made subject to ex ante and 
ex post examination or investigation.‟ Further that „that examination must – thus 




With relation to ex ante review; bearing in mind the precautionary obligations 
introduced by article 57 of Protocol I,
126
 Barak held that a „meticulous examination‟ 
of every case potentially giving rise to collateral damage is required prior to the 
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 Barak then not only went on to introduced a requirement for ex post 
review, but he stated that this review process should ultimately be subject to judicial 
supervision; that ‘judicial review of the decisions of the objective examination 
committee should be allowed‟
128
 Peer review by other states or organs of state would 
be insufficient as a result, inter alia, of the political pressure in the global 
community. So it seems that for the Israeli Supreme Court, the solution to the 
ambiguity of the application of the term "proportionality" lies in investigations, both 





This, however, Cohen recognises is not without its complications. I agree 
with him that the existence of these investigative procedures does nothing in terms of 
further defining the principle of proportionality and how it should apply. In my view 
though, it provides the essential platform for this to happen in future. 
 
Drawing on „reasonableness‟ arguments, he explores at depth what he sees as 
apt requirements for ex ante investigations.
130
 After only mentioning this concept 
briefly, I will instead primarily focus on what would be required in ex post review. 
 
The ex ante review is one of the basic requirements of Protocol I,
131
 and it 
seems that most armies are using legal advisors to verify that such a review is 
undertaken.
132
 Whatever the context, states must be able to verify that their militaries 




Ex post reviews can have many different meanings. Ultimately though, what 
it provides for is an accountability mechanism to be in place. Whether it be in the 
form of internal or external investigations, it is a means of evaluating the 
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effectiveness and legality of military missions. Ex post review ensures that a judicial 
body will eventually examine the actions of a military commander;
134
 that there is a 
separation of powers. It stands to reason that a commander who knows that he will 
be held accountable for his actions is more likely to err on the side of caution in 
considering all possibilities when reaching a decision whether or not to act.   
 
As is the case with many investigations, there is the possibility for an ex post 
review to have  inaccurate results. In cases involving accusations of human rights 
violations, many courts have given effect as to how an investigation should, in their 
eyes be conducted. Most succinctly and expansive though, would be the description 




The European Court of Human Rights ruled that the death of civilians 
provided prima facie grounds for claiming violation of the right to life, and deemed 
the internal Russian investigation that exonerated all participants to have been 
insufficient.
136
 Here the court specified that in order for an investigation in these 
matters to be considered adequate, four criteria had to be met: 
 
1) The formal and practical independence of the investigators from the 
persons whose actions they were examining;  
2) The ability of the investigation to lead to effective remedies including, 
where appropriate, criminal investigations; 
3) The promptness of the investigation; and 




International law does not limit the implementation of an ex post review to only these 
requirements. However, I contend that the four requirements set out by the ECHR 
provide the general basis for the type of investigation that should be initiated into 
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A potential concern that may in future arise out of these four criteria is that 
nowhere is there an indication as to their relative weighting in value, either in 
assessment or application. However, Cohen asserts that an ex post investigation 
conducted in accordance with the guidelines set in the Isayeva case is „likely to force 
soldiers and commanders to consider an operation's impact on 'collateral damage' and 
its compliance with the requirements of proportionality when they plan or carry out 
an attack.‟
139
 He goes on to add that in order for such an investigation to be [more] 
effective, the members of the investigative team „should include military personnel 





Application and Conclusion  
 
While Israel is not a party to either the Rome Statute or the Additional Protocol, it 





Israel claims to be the victim of Palestinian aggression but the sheer 
asymmetry of power between the two sides leaves little to no room for doubt as to 
who is the real victim. This is indeed a conflict between „David and Goliath, but the 
Biblical image has been inverted - a small and defenceless Palestinian David faces a 
heavily armed, merciless and overbearing Israeli Goliath. The resort to brute military 
force is accompanied, as always, by the shrill rhetoric of victimhood and a farrago of 




When addressing the issue of the ongoing hostilities in Israel, on 23 
September 2009, during his speech before the U.N, President Obama expressed that 
the price of the conflict is paid by both Israeli and Palestinian citizens. That „after all 
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the politics and all the posturing, [the issue(s)] is about the right of every human 
being to live with dignity and security.‟
143
 This „dignity and security‟ I believe needs 
to be sought through the legal framework of ex ante and ex post review. 
 
Ex ante review: According to reports, both independent and from the MFA, 
the Israeli Defense Force [IDF] required military planners to take humanitarian law 
into account during the planning stages of the operation.
144
 Also it is clear that legal 





Prima facie evidence suggests that the ex ante process seems to have 
complied with proposed norms insofar as it has followed the correct steps of 
legitimate planning. The content of this planning, or rather the results of the 
humanitarian assessments undertaken before the military operation, would remain 
public debate without the existence of the ex post review. 
 
Ex post review: In applying this principle to Operation Cast Lead, Israel‟s 
compliance with the suggested framework is somewhat less convincing. Here I will 
consider the credibility of two ex post investigations that have taken place on the 
subject of Operation Cast Lead; one by the IDF
146
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The IDF's position is that the only investigations that will take place are internal 
military commissions, and criminal investigations by the IDF's Chief Legal 
Advisor.
148
 It contends that while there are internal investigations currently 
underway,
149





Results from five teams of investigators, appointed by the IDF to look into 
specific incidents in Operations Cast Lead were released on April 22, 2009 by the 
IDF spokesperson.
151
 These investigations found inter alia that throughout the 
fighting in Gaza, the IDF operated in accordance with international law and that  any 
incidents that may have been contrary to humanitarian values were unavoidable, and 




Internal investigations such as these and those resulting in the „Operation in 
Gaza” report, conducted by the IDF themselves, however, do not in my mind, meet 
the necessary threshold of impartiality of ex post investigations as suggested by both 
Israeli and international jurisprudence.  
 
The four characteristics of an ex post review set out in the Isayeva case 
require firstly the „formal and practical independence of the investigators from the 
persons whose actions they were examining‟. In the present case, the very nature of 
the internally-appointed investigators being members of the IDF would logically lead 
to a degree of bias in their findings. As a result of their association to the IDF, their 
independence from the subjects under investigations would not be formal, neither 
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would it be practical to assume there wouldn‟t be the potential for bias. IDF 




Secondly, the ability of the investigation to lead to effective remedies, 
including where appropriate, criminal investigations, is required. The military 
guidelines of the IDF allow for effective remedies and for criminal investigations to 
be both recommended and initiated.
154
 However, there was no mention of the scope 





As Cohen notes, criminal investigations would become problematic for at 
least three reasons; „the legal advisors unit of the IDF was involved in many of the 
decisions that require investigation;‟
156
 secondly, that „the legal advisors [could not 
be] completely independent;‟
157
 and third, that „a criminal investigation is always 





So in theory this would be possible, however, this step would necessitate their 
being an allowance made for this to happen. Also it would require an unfavourable, 
unbiased finding out of the investigation which is unlikely to occur within internal 
investigative framework.   
 
Thirdly, the investigation would need to be prompt. Here there are no hard 
and fast rules, however in the case at hand I would accept the timeframe employed 
by the IDF‟s investigations that were reported on in April, however, I would agree 
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reports found "mistakes", the IDF's spokesperson announcement does not mention any sanctions. 
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 Cohen (note 14) at 9 cites Colonel, Advocate Pnina Sharvit-Baruch (retired), former IDF chief 
legal advisor for international law, Lecture at Tel Aviv University (Feb. 2, 2009). 
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Lastly, the Isayeva case requires the availability of public scrutiny. As the 
MFA outlines, all decisions of the Military Advocate General may be subject to 
further review by the Attorney General of the State of Israel.
160
  The fact that it was 
decided that all findings of the five major field investigations, and the Military 
Advocate General's decisions, be transferred for review by the Attorney General is a 
mere factual scenario. The words „may be subject to further review‟ (emphasis 
added) impose a restriction that could prevent this process from taking place. And 
after all, how much public scrutiny would be afforded by the Attorney General on 
review anyway? 
 
After having applied the requirements from the Isayeva case, it becomes clear 
in my mind that the ex post reviews, commissioned and or completed by the IDF 
itself, lack credibility in international law and consequently so would their findings.  
Goldstone Report 
 
Following the adoption on 12 January 2009 of resolution S-9/1 by the United 
Nations Human Rights Council at the end of its 9th Special Session,
161
 on 3 April 
2009, the President of the Human Rights Council established an international 
independent Fact Finding Mission with the mandate: “to investigate all violations of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have 
been committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were 
conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, 




The Mission comprised of four people: Professor Christine Chinkin, 
Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics and Political 
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 United Nations fact finding mission on the Gaza conflict, available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/FactFindingMission.htm [Accessed 
26 September 2009]. 
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Science, who was a member of the High Level Fact Finding Mission to Beit Hanoun 
(2008); Ms. Hina Jilani, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and former 
Special Representative of the Secretary General on Human Rights Defenders, who 
was a member of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2004); Colonel 
Desmond Travers, a former officer in the Irish Armed Forces and member of the 
Board of Directors of the Institute for International Criminal Investigations (IICI); 
and as the missions head, Justice Richard Goldstone, former member of the South 
African Constitutional Court and former Chief Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The mission also had the 





The requirements from the Isayeva case require firstly the „formal and 
practical independence of the investigators from the persons whose actions they were 
examining‟. As alluded to above, the members of the mission where all highly skilled 
in their various fields, with vast (including military) experience between them, and 
had no direct association to any of the parties they were examining. On this basis I 
would contend that the mission satisfies the first requirement of impartiality.  
 
The ability of the investigation to lead to effective remedies including, where 
appropriate, criminal investigations is required as the second characteristic of 
credible ex post review. One of the reports‟ listed recommendations is that, within 
the framework of Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, „in the absence of 
good faith investigations that are independent and in conformity with international 
standards, having been undertaken...‟ (by the appropriate authorities of the State of 
Israel) „... or being under way within six months of the date of its resolution, again 
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, [the Mission] refer[s] 
the situation in Gaza to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court pursuant to 
Article 13 (b) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.‟
164
 It is clear from its 
exhaustive list of recommendations that it was within the missions mandate to 
provide both remedies and avenues for criminal investigations.  
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As already mentioned, the definition of the expediency element to the ex post 
review is a contentious one. I would contend though the mission was given the date 





Lastly the requirement of public scrutiny needs to be satisfied. An advanced 
edited version of the missions report was issued on 15 September 2009.
166
 This, 
coupled with the public nature of the Missions report of its findings on 29 September 
would be more than adequate in my view.    
 
In applying the same requirements to the Goldstone Report as I have to the 
IDF review(s), I conclude the (UNHRC) Mission‟s report, to not only have 
adequately satisfied them, but also that the report and nature of the review itself is 
credible in international law. 
 
Having established this, I would further argue that the actual findings of the 
report would be supported by the same impartial credibility. The Missions mandate 
was investigative; commissioned to inspect, analyse and report back to the 
international community on its findings. If the credibility of this ex post review is 
understood to be accepted, which would be my contention, then it stands to reason 
that the facts presented by the report would also be accurate.  
 
The report found inter alia that both Israel and Palestinian militant groups 
took actions amounting to war crimes, and possibly crimes against humanity;
167
 that 
“[w]hile the Israeli government... sought to portray its operations as essentially a 
response to rocket attacks in the exercises of its right to self-defence..., the mission 
considers the plan to have been directed, at least in part, at a different target: the 
people of Gaza as a whole.”
168
 Also that Operation Cast Lead was “a deliberately 
disproportionate attack [by the IDF] designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a 
civilian population, radically diminish its local economic capacity both to work and 
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Ultimately it held in paragraph 1692, that „whatever violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law may have been committed, the 
systematic and deliberate nature of the activities described... leaves the Mission in no 
doubt that responsibility lies in the first place with those who designed, planned, 




While IHL aims to circumscribe certain behaviour in armed conflict, there 
will always be States, non-State armed groups and individuals who will not be 
deterred from violating the rules, regardless of the penalty involved.  
 
“It is the view of the Mission that universal jurisdiction is a potentially 
efficient tool for enforcing international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law, preventing impunity and promoting international 
accountability. In the context of increasing unwillingness on the part of Israel 
to open criminal investigations that comply with international standards and 
establish judicial accountability over its military actions in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, and until such a time as clarity is achieved as to 
whether the International Criminal Court will exercise jurisdiction over 
alleged crimes committed in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in 
Gaza, the Mission supports the reliance on universal jurisdiction as an avenue 
for States to investigate violations of grave breach provisions of the Geneva 





The global motivation for accountability in modern international law for violations of 
IHL is great.
172
 Cases specifically pertaining to Israel are pending before national 






; in South 
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Operation Cast Lead is just one of many contemporary demonstrations of the 
difficulties of compliance with IHL in modern armed conflict. Reality in the 
Operations aftermath  has shown that the foundational principles of IHL that are by 
design intended to ensure the protection of civilians, „took a severe beating in this 
conflict.‟
177
 It is clear that “[a]ll allegations of violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights violations during the Gaza military operations 
must be investigated by credible, independent and transparent accountability 





In an attempt to accommodate the harsh realities of modern warfare, and by 
doing so avoid wanton disregard for the rights of civilians during times of hostilities, 
what I propose by this article is tantamount to the extension of IHL.  
 
I concur with Cohen
179
 in proposing that an ex post investigation is essential 
to the pursuit of justice for all civilians caught up in the exploits of modern armed 
conflict and that this ex post review be based on the requirement of ius in bello 
proportionality; the application of the principle of proportionality requires that, to 
truly ascertain the level(s) of compliance with IHL in times of hostilities, an ex post 
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officials. 
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